Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1959

Asie J. Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical
Corporation : Petition for Rehearing Brief of
Defendant and Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Marvin J. Bertoch; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., No. 8872 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3114

This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

I

'- ~-

'

, - ,-,

In the Supreme COUrt ofr
the State of
ASIE

¥

tfL

ED

sEP 1 51959

J. WEBB,

vs.

~

Case No. 8872

OLIN MATHIESON CHEMICAL
CORPORATION,
Defendant and Appellant.

PETITION. FOR REHEARING
BRIEF OF
DEFENDANT AND APP'ELLANT
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
MARVIN J. BERTOCH
Attorneys for Defendant
and AP·Pellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

STATEMENT OF FACTS ___________ --------------------------------------------------

1

STATEMENT OF POINTS -------------------------------------------------------

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

The Court erred in overlooking controlling authority
on the subject matter of this case set forth as follows
in the Utah case of Bennett v. Pilot Products Company, 235 P. (2) 525:
"The manufacturer is at least entitled to assume
that the chattel will be put to a normal use by
a normal user, and is not subject to liability
where it would ordinarily be safe, but injury
results from some unusual use or some personal
idiosyncrasy of the consumer."

POINT II ------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

The Court erred in overlooking or misinterpreting or
misapprehending material facts in the record.

POINT III ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12
New cases decided in 19 58 should be considered.

POINT IV -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
General grounds for rehearing.

CONCLUSI ON __________ ----------------------------------------------------------------- 18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES CITED

PAGE

Basso v. Veysey ----------------------------------------------------- 17

Bennett v. Pilot Products Company _________________________ 2, 3, 4, 11

City of Milwaukee v. Public Service Commission ------------ 17

Crawford v. Bach -------------------------------------- 17

Hadrian v. Milwaukee Electric Railway & Transport Company_ 16

Hewett v. General Tire & Rubber Company ______

Hooper v. General Motors Corporation

_ 4

18

Kirchgestner v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway Co. _ _ 18

Rawls v. Zigler -----------------------------------------

12

Tohan v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc. --------------- 14

U. S. Phosphoric Products Corporation v. Lester----------- 17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court of
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ASIE

J. WEBB,
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vs.

Case No. 8872

OLIN MATHIESON CHEMICAL
CORPORATION,
Defendan.t and Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
BRIEF OF
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts involved in this action are set forth accurately on pages one to three of the appellant's original brief.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERLOOKING CONTROLLING AUTHORITY O·N THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CASE SET FORTH AS FOLLOWS IN
THE UTAH CASE OF BENNETT V. PILOT PRODUCTS COMPANY, 235 P. (2) 525:
((The manufacturer is at least entitled to assume that the chattel will be put to a normal use
by a normal user, and is not subject to liability
where it would ordinarily be safe, but injury results from some unusual use or some personal idiosyncrasy of the consumer."

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERLOOKING OR
MISINTERPRETING OR MISAPPREHENDING MATERIAL FACTS IN THE RECORD.
POINT III
NEW CASES DECIDED IN 1958 SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED.
POINT IV
GENERAL GROUNDS FOR REHEARING.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERLOOKING CONTROLLING AUTHORITY IN UTAH ON THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CASE.
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Counsel failed to cite in his original brief, and the
Court apparently failed to consider the case of Bennett
v. Pilot Products Company, 23 5 P. (2) 525, a Utah case
decided in 1951.
In that case the plaintiff, a beautician, brought action against the seller for negligence in distributing without warnings a permanent wave lotion which plaintiff
claimed to be unfit for the use for which it was intended
and charged that it contained irritants dangerous to
users, which fact seller knew or should have known, and
which irritants injured the beautician who used the lotion.
The appeal was from an order of the trial court
granting a motion for non-suit. The judgment of the
trial court was affirmed.
The facts in the case revealed that the beautician, instead of using the lotion in the manner in which it was
intended to be used, added to it a fixative. Patch tests
conducted revealed that the plaintiff did not react unfavorably either to the lotion or the fixative, but did to a
mixture of the two, and it was an established fact that
using the two mixed together resulted in a serious case
of dermatitis, necessitating that the plaintiff give up her
business as a beautician. Adopting a statement made by
Dean Prosser in his work on Torts, P. 679, the Court said:
HThe manufacturer is at least entitled to assume that the chattel will be put to a normal use
by a normal user, and is not subject to liability
where it would ordinarily be safe, but injury results from some unusual use or some personal idiosyncrasy of the consumer."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

The Court concluded:
((Any feeling of sympathy for appellant must
yield to a common sense application of the rule of
foreseeability such as is embraced within the above
quotation of Dean Prosser. We are disposed to
feel that respondent fairly could not be held to
have foreseen what in fact happened when the
thioglycolate (in the lotion) itself harmless to appellant, in combination with the fixative, equally
harmless, reacted on her because of an allergic skin,
in such a way as to result in dermatitis."
Relating that case to the one at bar, it can be said
with equal logic that the manufacturer, Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corporation, could not be fairly held to have
foreseen that its receiver which it had tested thoroughly
at the time of its manufacture and found harmless,
would be separated from the remainder of the gun it was
designed to serve and made a part of a different contraption which was so designed as to impose greater stress on
it than was contemplated and increase the possibility of
a case separation.
There is no question that heretofore the law in Utah
has been as set forth in the Bennett v. Pilot Products
Company case and as it was set forth in Hewett v. General Tire f5 Rubber Company, 284 P. (2) 471, decided in
1955. The majority opinion in this case makes reference
to the General Tire case, but significantly, in quoting
from it, leaves out the very words in the opinion which
are applicable to this case. In the opinion in this case filed
on August 12, 1959, the Court speaking of plaintiff said:
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uHe seeks recovery under the now well-established doctrine which imposes liability upon the
manufacturer for injuries resulting from defects in
such a product when it is used in accordance with
its intended purpose."
The Court then cited the General Tire case. It is
interesting to note the language which the Court left out
in quoting the General Tire case. The whole sentence
found on page 475 of the decision reads as follows:
uA manufacturer is liable when he fails to
exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a
chattel which, unless carefully made, involves unreasonable risk to those who lawfully use it in a
manner and for a purpose for which it is manufactured."
The Court in restating that rule in the instant case
ignored the words and the concept contained in the words
rrin a manner." The Court's opinion in the case at bar
overrules that portion of the opinion in the General Tire
& Rubber Company case. The writer does not know
whether the Court intended that or not, but that is the
unmistakable affect of it. It is indisputable from the
facts of the record that the plaintiff did not use the receiver manufactured by the defendant in a manner for which
it was manufactured. It was obviously never intended
by the manufacturer that its receiver should be removed
from the remainder of the gun and made a part of a polyglot ballistics misfit, which was the gun in the plaintiff's
hands when he was injured. The manufacturer obviously
never intended or anticipated that its receiver should be
affixed to a barrel made by a Nevada gunsmith unknown
to them (and unknown to Mr. Titus, the Utah gunsmith
who testified), which barrel, according to the undisputed
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testimony of all the witnesses, was different from the barrel designed to go with the defendant's receiver, which
contained a chamber longer and an extractor slot deeper
and wider than that designed to be used with this receiver.
The manufacturer obviously did not anticipate nor intend
that this receiver should be used in a remade gun and expected to support ammunition that was not designed for
the gun, ammunition that was larger in caliber, ammunition that was prepared by the plaintiff, ammunition
which included a faster burning, more explosive powder
than the ammunition designed by the manufacturer for
use with this receiver and casings that had been thinned
by repeated use. (See page 125, plaintiff's testimony as
to thinning of casings) .
It is utterly and absolutely specious to say that the
defendant's receiver was used in a manner for which it
was manufactured.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERLOOKING OR
MISINTERPRETING OR MISAPPREHENDING MATERIAL FACTS IN THE RECORD.
The manner in which the receiver was used by the
plaintiff was not only different from the manner in which
the manufacturer intended it to be used, but it was used
in a manner which at least may have been the sole proximate cause or a proximate cause of the injury suffered
by the plaintiff.
Plaintiff's counsel in his original brief very properly
stated as follows on Page 3 1 :
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rrw e will agree that if any modifications made
on the gun after it left the factory in any way increased the strain on the receiver and increased its
tendency to blow up, such would be a defense."
The writer submits, and will later document the fact
that the undisputed evidence is that the modifications
made on the gun after it left the factory increased the
strain on the receiver by increasing the possibility of a
case separation, which occurred. It was the undisputed
evidence of all the experts who testified with regard to
the matter that if the extractor slot in the barrel was deeper, that is, longer, it would remove some support from the
cartridge and increase the possibility of a case separation.
There were four expert witnesses who testified with regard to that matter: the plaintiff's Mr. Casull and the defendant's Mr. Morgan, Mr. Speer and Mr. Titus. As
set forth in this Court's opinion in this case, Mr. Casull
uadmitted on cross-examination that if the extractor slot
of the gun was deeper (longer) more of the cartridge
case would be exposed and thus increase the danger of it
rupturing." As indicated in the opinion, Mr. Morgan,
Mr. Speer and Mr. Titus testified to the same effect, that
is, if the extractor slot were deeper, it would increase the
possibility of a rupture of the casing. Therefore, the evidence on that issue is undisputed. Mr. Casull testified
that he did not measure the depth of the extractor slot
and did not know whether it was deeper or not. Messrs.
Morgan, Speer and Titus said that it was deeper. There-

fore the evidence is undisputed on the point that it was
deeper. When Mr. Casull later said that he did not believe this different extractor slot would contribute to the
case separation, he was not basing his opinion on the un-
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disputed evidence. If he had based his opm10n on the
undisputed evidence, which was to the effect that the extractor slot was deeper, then he would have had to say,
to be consistent with his statement on cross-examination,
that the new extractor slot did increase the danger of a
case separation.
A most extraordinary position is taken by this Court
in the following statement in its opinion:
((The negligible effect of this small increase
in depth seems apparent when it is remembered
that the slot runs around only a portion of the circumference of the barrel."
Such a statement is incredible because by it the majority of this Court assume the role of gunsmiths and physicists and substitute their expert opinion for the opinion
of the four and only experts who testified on that subject
in this case. With that statement, the majority of this
Court is saying to the people who have been manufacturing the Winchester rifle for seventy-five years, ((What is
all this nonsense about a fraction of an inch? After all
you are only dealing with 40,000 or 50,000 or 60,000
pounds of pressure per square inch, so why waste your
time using micrometers? Exposing a little more of the
thin metal of the cartridge case to such pressure is rnegligible.'"
Additional indisputable evidence that the modification of the gun was a factor in causing the accident is
found in the fact that when the gun was used in the
manner intended by the manufacturer, no cartridge case
ruptured and the receiver did not break. The evidence
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supporting that fact is in two parts; first, the evidence
is that this particular rifle was tested thoroughly at the
factory. The undisputed testimony with regard to that
testing is set forth on pages 164 through 173 of the record,
and on pages 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the appellant's original
brief.
Mr. Morgan testified that the factory ammunition to
be used in this gun is not designed to produce more than
54,000 pounds pressure per square inch, but in testing
the gun, charges were fired in it which produced substantially more pressure than that. He said on page 169
of the record that in the case of this rifle they used a
uproof cartridge developing from 70,000 to 70,500
pounds on the average," or at least, he said, ((17,000
pounds higher in the proof load than in the commercial
ammunition." Then on page 171 of the record, Mr.
Morgan said:
((We recognize the fact that when we subject
any gun to pressure in excess of 70,000 pounds
there is an element of danger involved, but we are
deliberately trying to destroy this gun if it is
defective, and in order to safeguard our people we
have an extremely heavy wood box with an appropriate rest inside of it which the gun is put
into, in it recoils, so that the stock will leap up and
the recoil is stopped.
uThe definitive proof cartridge is a clearly
identified cartridge. It is not brass, brass like the
ammunition you buy. It is cadmium plated and
is laquered in brilliant red.
((The gun is laid in the rest, the cartridge is
inserted in the chamber, the bolt is closed, and then
this heavy box is pulled down over the entire gun
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so that it is enclosed. The man reaches in through
a little vent or a hole with an iron hook about
three feet long and pulls the trigger while the gun
is enclosed in the box. Some, of course, explode."
Mr. Morgan had the card which evidenced the fact
that these spe-cific tests were made on this specific gun;
that the receiver withstood the pressure; that it passed
that and other tests evidencing that it was a standard, undefective, safe receiver when it left the factory if it was
used in the manner in which it was intended that it
should be used.
The second irrefutable item of evidence that the receiver was safe as long as it was used in the manner in
which it was intended to be used is the fact that the plaintiff fired ((90 to 100 rounds" in the gun prior to the time
that he first had it rebarreled, and the receiver performed
its function safely and without incident.
Plaintiff's counsel will ·Contest this last item of evidence. The fact is that, according to the court reporter
who took Mr. Webb's deposition, Webb testified on deposition that he fired 90 to 100 rounds in the gun without
incident prior to the time that he had the gun rebarreled
the first time by Mr. Ackley. The fact that the court
reporter so recorded his testimony on deposition appears
in the record in this case on pages 13 2 to 13 5. According to the .court reporter, Mr. Webb, the plaintiff, testified as follows:
uQ. How many rounds of ammunition did you
fire through the rifle in between the time you
purchased it, and the time you took it to Ackley, say, in May of 1955?
uA. Less than a hundred rounds.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ttQ.
etA.
uQ.
ttA.
ttQ.
ttA.

Well, that could be zero?
Yes, it could.
Would you give me some idea?
Oh, let's say, ninety to a hundred rounds.
And where was that firing done?
Up at the rifle range, police range here, and in
the field. Most of it was test work at the
rifle range."

Mr. Rampton contended at the trial that the first
answer indicated above, uless than one hundred rounds,"
was a typographical error, and that it had been changed
by Mr. Webb when he read the deposition; that the
words ((less than a hundred rounds" had been stricken by
Mr. Webb, and the word ((none" had been substituted by
Mr. Webb on the ridiculous grounds that the reporter had
made a typographical error. However, Mr. Rampton
admitted that his later answer, ttOh, let's say, ninety to a
hundred rounds" had not been changed by Mr. Webb,
and I assume, therefore, was not a typographical error.

Mr. Webb, of course, changed his testimony at the
trial after seeing the damaging nature of the truth he had
told at the time of the deposition. At the trial he told the
obviously unlikely story that he bought this gun, retained
it over two weeks and never fired a shot out of it until he
had it rebarreled.
In the case of Bennett v. Pilot Products Company,
supra, the Court was faced with a similar incident. In
that case, the plaintiff had changed her testimony at the
trial from that which she had given on deposition. In
that case, at trial, the plaintiff claimed that the application of the· lotion had caused injury to her partner's
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hands, and at the trial her partner had confirmed that
testimony. The court said:
({Significantly, on cross-examination, she
(plaintiff) admitted having testified previously on
deposition that her partner had not suffered any
injury from such use. Significant also is the fact
that her partner failed to testify on deposition that
she was affected by use of the products."
The precedent enunciated in that case entitles the
court to place significance in this case on the difference
between the plaintiff's testimony on deposition and his
testimony at the trial.
The receiver performed adequately and safely as long
as it was used in the manner in which it was intended to
be used.

POINT III
NEW CASES DECIDED IN 1958 SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED.
There are two recent cases which are analogous to
the extent that they should be considered by this Court
on rehearing. They are both cases in which the manufacturer or seller was charged with negligence, and in
which there was an intervening act on the part of the
plaintiff buyer which could be described either as uusing
the chattel in a manner in which it was not intended to
be used" or ttcontributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff buyer." In both cases, the Court held that the
seller or manufacturer was not to be held liable.
One of those cases is Rawls v. Zigler, 107 So. (2) 601,
a Florida case. A motorist and wife brought action to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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recover for injuries sustained in a collision occurring when
a truck sideswiped their automobile. The action was
brought against the driver and owner and seller of the
truck and against a partnership hired by the seller to
mount a body on the truck. The negligence charged
against the seller and the partnership hired to mount the
body on the truck was that the body mounted on the
truck was designed to hold a greater load than the truck
was designed to hold; that the body was overloaded and
because of that, it came loose from the truck and moved in
such a manner as to cause a collision with the plaintiff's
automobile.
The negligence charged against the plaintiffs, which
it was believed contributed to the accident, was the operation of their automobile with defective brakes.
Summary judgment in favor of the seller and partnership was entered by the trial court and the plaintiffs
appealed. The appellate court upheld the trial court deCISion.

The language of the court found on page 607 is
strikingly significant when it is considered in the light of
the facts of the case at bar.
The Court said:
((But the statements of the witnesses * * ~
showed clearly that the overloading of the truck
on the built up springs could not reasonably be
found to be the sole cause of the accident. (Emphasis supplied). Concurring in the end result
were the brake failure (or the failure of Paul
Zigler (plaintiff) to operate the brakes properly)
at what might have been an excessive speed in the
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circumstances, followed by some exceptioned force
applied to the rivets, such as the sudden swerving
of the truck or its impact with the car. Regardless of whether the jury may subsequently exonerate Paul Zigler (plaintiff) of negligence (as to
which we express no opinion) , the fact remains
that, superimposed upon the negligence, if any,
of Luby (defendant seller) were independent
intervening forces without which the accident
would not have occurred. These hazards might
have been foreseen by Luby as remote possibilities;
but we have found no case, and none has been
cited, holding that a manufacturer or supplier, or
any other defendant, must cpay off' for failure to
foresee a remote eventuality."
The other very recent case is Tohan v. Joseph T.
Ryerson f5 Son, Inc., et al, 165 Fed. Supp. 638. This case
was decided by the United States District Court of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1958.
In this case the plaintiffs' employer purchased two
I beams from the defendant, and when the I beams were
put into use to support a scaffold, they bent and upset the
scaffold so that the plaintiffs fell from the scaffold and
were injured. It was charged by the plaintiffs that the I
beams sold by the defendant were not suitable for the job
for which the defendant sold them. The court found that
if the plaintiffs' employer who purchased the beams had
braced the beams properly, they would not have bent and
the accident would not have occurred. The Court said:
ttThere was no obligation upon Ryerson (the
seller) to foresee that simple ordinary precautions
would not be taken to keep the beams in proper
position and to prevent the very thing that happened."
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The Court in making its ruling referred to the Restatement and said:
((Section 401 of the Restatement of Torts
does not impose the responsibility upon a vendor
to anticipate an improper use of an otherwise adequate chattel. The negligence which caused the
accident was that of Custodis (the employer)
solely and not of Ryerson. Therefore the verdict
against Ryerson cannot stand."
Earlier in its opinion, the Court said:
((The court, after a review of the entire case,
agrees with the position taken by Ryerson that it
had (no reason to know' that the beams would be
used without Custodis taking simple precautions
in their use to prevent harm to its employees. From
all the evidence the conclusion is inescapable that
the beams were suitable for the purpose for which
they were sold. They had functioned adequately

for a period of two weeks and under circumstances
wherein much greater stress and weight than at
the time of the accident had been placed upon
them." (Emphasis supplied.)
The application of this case to the one at bar is obvious. The receiver involved had functioned adequately
prior to the time that it was rebarreled, and in the factory
it had been subjected to much greater stress than would
be imposed upon it had it not been for the modification
of its use by the plaintiff.
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POINT IV
GENERAL GROUNDS FOR REHEARING.
Counsel is cognizant of the fact that a rehearing is
not for the purpose of reviewing and rearguing matters
already fully considered at the time of the initial argument before the Court. He recognizes also that no new
issues may be introduced, but that if the Court has overlooked or misinterpreted or misapprehended significant
authority or material facts which relate to issues which
were included in the briefs or arguments of the parties,
then the Court is justified in granting a rehearing.
The cases cited briefly below set forth the general
purpose of rehearing and the grounds upon which a Court
is justified in its discretion to grant a rehearing. The appellant submits that the errors cited above are such as obligate the Court to grant a rehearing under the standards
set forth in the cases below.
In the case of Hadrian v. Milwaukee Electric Railf5 Transport Company, 3 N. W. (2) 700, 241 Wis.
122, modified 5 N. W. (2) 765, 241 Wis. 122, the court
granted a rehearing in the tort case due to the fact that
the court believed that it had perhaps overlooked important facts in its previous consideration of the case.

way

The case was one in which a woman sustained injuries when struck by a train of two street cars from
which she had alighted. Rehearing was granted for reargument of the issue as to whether blood stains separately or in connection with other facts bearing on the
location of the woman at and after the accident conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stituted ((physical factsn contrary to testimony given by
the woman and others that she was on the elevated portion
of a safety zone when struck.
In the case of Basso v. V eysey, 110 Ad. ( 2) 70 6, the
court said:
((The purpose of a motion for reargument is to
point out matters presented in the briefs and relied
upon in the original argument which it is thought
were overlooked or misapprehended by the court
in reviewing the case."
In City of Milwaukee v. Public Service Commission,
47 N. W. (2) 298, 259 Wis. 30, the court said:

.. A petition for rehearing is ordinarily for the purpose of directing attention to matters said to have
been overlooked or mistakenly conceived in the
original decision, and thus invites a reconsideration upon the record upon which that decision
rested."
In Crawford v. Bach, 101 N. E. (2) 144, an Ohio
case, the court said:
HI£ the court has failed to consider some material
question or has overlooked some controlling authority or principle of law, it will entertain such
an application." (for rehearing).
In U. S. Phosphoric Products Corporation v. Lester,
156 So. 753, 116 Fla. 309, decided in 1934, the Florida
Supreme Court granted a motion for rehearing ((where
proof respecting contributory negligence, made the basis
for judgment denying employee a recovery, was misconceived."
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Kirchgestner v. Denver 5 Rio Grande Western Railway Company, 225 P. (2) 754, (Utah 1950) was an
F.E.L.A. case, in which the court, speaking through Justice Wolfe, said:

ttlt not being free from doubt what degree of
proof applies, a rehearing is granted to allow the
parties to reargue and submit further authority on
that question."
CONCLUSION
The opinion rendered in this case by this Cpurt, if
not modified, changes radically the present Utah law on
the subject matter involved, and the opinion establishes
law that is not recognized in any state of the United
States. The opinion alters substantially the law enunciated in the cases of Bennett v. Pilot Products Company,

Hewett v. General Tire 5 Rubber, and Hooper v. General
Motors Corporation, 260 P. (2) 549, because it removes
the protection given to the manufacturer in those cases
where the chattel is not used uin the manner" in which it
was intended to be used. The opinion promulgated by
this Court establishes the law in this State to be that if
there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury as to the
manufacturer's negligence, then the manufacturer is liable
regardless of the fact that the chattel was not used in the
manner in which it was intended to be used. He is, in
fact, liable even if the chattel is used in a manner which
he could not reasonably anticipate that it would be used.

He is liable, in fact, even if it is used in a manner which
he would not approve and which he would believe to be
a dangerous use, (the depth of the extractor slot) .
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The establishment of such a rule of law is inequitable
and unjust. Under such a rule, what can a manufacturer
do to protect himself? There is nothing he can do. He
can devise the most complete, thorough, accurate, foolproof system of testing conceivable-one that a Court
would have to consider was absolutely perfect, and yet it
would not protect him. In his case the manufacturer had
established tests based on seventy-five years of experience
that were obviously thorough and exhaustive, and those
tests were applied to this particular gun and the adequacy
of those tests was not questioned nor criticized in any
manner by the plaintiff in this ·Case. Yet under the ruling
of the rna jority of this Court, those tests were of no protection to him whatsoever.
I submit that the court in its opinion in this case
either overlooked or misapprehended or misinterpreted
existing law and material facts in the record; that it misapprehended the far-reaching, drastic, unjust nature of
the new law which it established. Defendant appeals to the
Court to reverse its opinion, to reverse the verdict of the
jury and decide this case in favor of the defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
By
Marvin J. Bertoch
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